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I. INTRODUCTION
“Among the most misunderstood aspects of law and order are prop-
erty rights.”1
-Thomas Sowell
“[O]ne can learn a great deal of jurisprudence from the works of
literature . . . .”2
-Richard A. Posner
For the last several decades, legal scholars have used works of liter-
ature to gain a fuller understanding of the nature and purpose of law.
† J.D. and Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law Spring 2015, M.A.,
Denver Seminary, 2013, M.A.T., Georgia College & State University, 2006, B.S.,
Georgia College & State University, 2005.
The author would like to thank the following people for their support: Sarah Ben-
ton, John & Diane Benton, Doug Groothuis, Rick Maes, and Ryan Kearns.
1. THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS 422 (4th ed. 2011).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 21–22 (3d ed. 2009).
25
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This field of study is known as Law and Literature.3  Proponents of
this new discipline of legal scholarship endeavor to use literature as a
unique lens through which legal issues can be studied, understood,
and applied.4  However, some Law and Literature detractors either
question the legitimacy of this new academic project outright, or at
least require more convincing.5  Indeed, even among Law and Litera-
ture supporters, there is a wide spectrum of opinions regarding the
nature and purpose of Law and Literature.6
This Article offers J.R.R. Tolkien’s classic stories, The Hobbit and
The Lord of the Rings Trilogy, as useful for Law and Literature schol-
arship because they have a large audience of all ages, who have either
read them in books or seen them as movies.  Their widespread popu-
larity makes these stories an effective way to introduce and inspire
many to the property law jurisprudence that permeates the texts.
While Tolkien’s literature has not been traditionally utilized for Law
and Literature purposes, there are several issues of property law juris-
prudence that can be elucidated through Tolkien’s writings.
This Article begins by briefly assessing the debate regarding the ef-
ficacy of Law and Literature, proposes Tolkien’s literature as a legiti-
mate means of stimulating an interest in property law jurisprudence,
and concludes by exploring a variety of property law issues using
Tolkien’s literature as the background material facts.
II. LAW AND LITERATURE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Introduction to Law and Literature
Law and Literature is an academic pursuit built on the premise that
“literature can teach lawyers, judges, and legal scholars basic things
about how the law does operate, and how it should . . . .”7  While the
roots of Law and Literature can be traced decades earlier, there was
an explosion of Law and Literature legal scholarship in the 1980s, and
that trend has continued.8  This is not to say all legal scholars have
signed on to Law and Literature without trepidation.  Indeed, many in
the legal academy have wrestled with the legitimacy of this sub-disci-
pline and the role it should play in legal scholarship, if any.9  Some
3. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); see also Bruce L.
Rockwood, Preface to Critic of Institutions-9, Law and Literature Perspectives 1
(Bruce L. Rockwood ed. 1996).
4. See, e.g., Rockwood ed., supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATIONSHIP (1988).
6. See infra note 15.
7. BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 257 (6th ed. 2012).
8. See WHITE, supra note 3; see also BIX, supra note 7 (“Benjamin Cardozo . . .
wrote an article [in 1925] on the literary styles of judicial opinions . . . .”).
9. See generally Gary Minda, Law and Literature at Century’s End, 9 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 245 (1997).
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scholars are ambivalent about the efficacy of Law and Literature.10
Still other scholars have embraced Law and Literature with enthusi-
asm, recognizing that literature may help us understand depths of the
law not yet understood.11
Perhaps the high-water mark for the Law and Literature debate
came in the United States Supreme Court’s opinion of Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc. in which Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer
clashed over how to best appropriate the Robert Frost poem, “Mend-
ing Wall.”12  Justice Scalia referenced “Mending Wall” to support the
proposition that in a government with separated powers, “Good
fences make good neighbors.”13  Justice Breyer disagreed with Scalia’s
application of the poem, and responded, “One might consider as well
[Frost’s] caution, for he not only notes that ‘something there is that
doesn’t love a wall,’ but also writes, ‘Before I built a wall I’d ask to
know / What I was walling in or walling out.’”14  While opinions re-
garding who had correctly applied Frost varied, this Supreme Court
opinion provided a tacit legitimacy to Law and Literature in a way it
did not previously enjoy.  Nevertheless, in the wider context of legal
scholarship, Law and Literature is still a relatively new discipline with
a diversity of opinions regarding the nature and purpose of Law and
Literature.15
B. Theories of Law and Literature
Law and Literature has typically been appropriated in two ways:
law-as-literature, and law-in-literature.16  Law-as-literature frames the
practice of law essentially as “the mastery of texts, whether of cases,
statutes, or the Constitution.”17 Pace legal positivism, the practice of
law is necessarily an endeavor to interpret and contextualize language,
as “the ordinary language of all developed legal systems includes con-
stant recourse to texts that authorize specific conduct.”18  This view
that law-as-literature is helpful in the interpretation of language is un-
10. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 13 (“The publication since 1984 of five
books on law and literature attests to the rapid growth of the field. But is it a healthy,
balanced, and fruitful growth? I have some doubts.”).
11. See generally Minda, supra note 9.
12. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc. 514 U.S. 211, 240, 245 (1995); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Rule that Congress Overstepped Bounds: Scalia and Breyer
Trade Quotes from ‘Mending Wall’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 1995), available at http://
www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88v/frost-scalia.html.
13. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240.
14. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW
AND LITERATURE 3 (Columbia Univ. Press, 1992) (“While Law and Literature now
commands the attention of a growing number of academics and practitioners, no uni-
fying manifesto or program has as yet been announced.”).
16. See generally Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982);
see also Minda, supra note 9.
17. Levinson, supra note 16, at 374.
18. Id.
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derscored by many Supreme Court decisions,19 as well as the canons
of construction that aid statutory interpretation.20  While there is a
significant disagreement with respect to how one ought to interpret
statutory language,21 there is little debate that this view of law-as-liter-
ature is a legitimate one.  As Gary Minda notes, “The law-as-litera-
ture perspective has been quite popular in legal studies throughout
the 1980s mainly because it has served to show how literary activity is
an integral part of the central activity of law—i.e., the interpretation
of legal texts (case opinions, statutes, and regulations).”22
While law-as-literature is generally considered useful, the law-in-
literature perspective received more of a mixed response.  Law-in-
literature has typically “attempted to show how the stories in the clas-
sics of Western literature might offer lawyers and judges important
lessons about the nature of law lessons which are missing in the offi-
cial reported stories of the cases.”23  While this early incarnation of
law-in-literature was well-received, its recent manifestations have
been more controversial.  Perhaps co-opted as part of the wider
postmodernist project that dominated English departments for the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century, the classical literature of “Dickens,
Kafka and Melville [was] being edged-out by authors like Derrida,
Foucault, Heidegger and Wittgenstein as Law and Literature scholars
explored the meaning of law’s language as a cultural and literary arti-
fact.”24  Thus, law in literature began a shift “beyond the Great books
of Western literature to the critical texts of literary theory, structural-
ism, post-structuralism, deconstuctionism and the like to aid them in
their literary translations of legal texts.”25  This shift blurred the lines
between law-as-literature and law-in-literature, and stigmatized Law
and Literature as a meaningless academic exercise, as devoid of mean-
ing as the very texts that the postmodern literary critics purported to
deconstruct.26  Indeed, the postmodern literary agenda is so en-
trenched in Law and Literature that there is currently a movement
afoot to go even “beyond law and literature in the traditional sense to
a new literary study of language as cultural discourse.”27  Before going
down this path, law-in-literature proponents would be wise to remem-
ber the late Christopher Hitchens observation that “[t]he
19. Id.
20. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REG-
ULATION 202 (Robert C. Clark ed., 2d ed. 2010).
21. See, e.g., Id.
22. Minda, supra note 9, at 246.
23. Id. at 245.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra note 35.
27. Minda, supra note 9, at 247; see also Peter J. Hutchings, Modern Forensics:
Photography and Other Subjects 9 CARDOZA STUD. L. & LITERATURE 229–243
(1997).
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Postmodernists’ tyranny wears people down by boredom and semi-
literate prose.”28
C. Supporters and Detractors
The increased interest in Law and Literature has touched off a spir-
ited scholarly debate regarding the efficacy of this new academic pro-
ject.29  The debate has become more pointed with the development of
the law-as-literature and law-in-literature perspectives.  Several pre-
eminent legal scholars have staked out positions on each side of the
debate, thus ensuring a conclusion settled by an adversarial system.
Professor Richard A. Posner seems to occupy the role of leading critic
of Law and Literature, while a variety of other scholars offer a robust
defense of this burgeoning discipline.30
The prolific judge and legal scholar Richard Posner has devoted an
entire book to the topic of Law and Literature.31  Now in its third
edition, Posner’s assessment of Law and Literature pulls no punches:
“I shall argue that only rarely can we learn much about the day-to-day
operations of a legal system from works of imaginative literature even
when they depict trials or other legal processes.”32  Statements such as
this cause many to consider Posner a staunch critic of Law and Litera-
ture.33  However, Posner himself contends that “if the first edition of
this book had rather a negative and even defensive character . . . that
was more than 20 years ago and the negative tone was gone by the
second edition.”34  Indeed, it seems that Posner’s antipathy toward
Law and Literature may be more properly understood as criticism of
particular developments within Law and Literature, rather than oppo-
sition to the movement in principle.  For example, Posner cites as
problematic Law and Literature’s incorporation of postmodern liter-
ary theory “that is making laughingstocks of English departments
. . . .”35  While Posner’s concern with respect to the problems of
postmodern literary theory is apt, it is worth noting that the Critical
Legal Studies (“CLS”) school has already adopted much of the
postmodern’s distain for metanarratives and belief that all truth is
28. Quoted in Jonah Goldberg, The Quote-Unquote Presidency, NATIONAL RE-
VIEW ONLINE (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/373397/quote-
unquote-presidency-jonah-goldberg/page/0/2.
29. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 21 (“I shall argue that only rarely can we
learn much about the day-to-day operations of a legal system from works of imagina-
tive literature even when they depict trials or other legal processes.”); see also POS-
NER, supra note 5, at 16 (“These attempted syntheses of law and literature are
ingenious and provocative but do not convince me.”).
30. See POSNER, supra note 2; see also POSNER, supra note 5.
31. See POSNER, supra note 2; see also POSNER, supra note 5.
32. POSNER, supra note 2, at 21 (emphasis added).
33. See generally ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (Martha Mi-
now, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds., 1993).
34. POSNER, supra note 2, at 6.
35. Id. at 10.
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merely a social construct.36  That is to say, if postmodernism in legal
scholarship is Posner’s problem, Law and Literature is hardly the only
category of legal scholarship under its influence.  Nevertheless, Pos-
ner’s stance appears to have shifted from outspoken critic to a more
sympathetic position.
Many scholars disagree with Posner’s bleak (or formerly bleak) as-
sessment of Law and Literature.  Law and Literature professors at the
University of Tennessee College of Law, Jerry J. Phillips and Judy M.
Cornett confidently state that “there are many reasons to teach Law
and Literature . . . .”37  Indeed, Phillips and Cornett are so convinced
of the importance of Law and Literature that they co-authored a text-
book to demonstrate and “support [the] many ways of teaching Law
and Literature.”38  Professor Bruce L. Rockwood waxes poetic in his
optimistic perspective on Law and Literature: “Law and literature are
like flint and steel over the kindling of our doubts and uncertainties in
a rapidly changing modern, or postmodern, world.  By knocking the
flint of literature against the steel of the law, we can make some
sparks that will illuminate our way to the future . . . .”39  Professor
Hilde Hein believes that the interdisciplinary approach of Law and
Literature is not only useful, but perhaps necessary given the limita-
tions of both law students and the study of law: “Approaching law
through art enlivens the law even as it permits exploration of law’s
gaps and exclusions.”40  Therefore, Hein concludes, “I believe that in-
sight into one area will also help us to understand the other.”41  Fi-
nally, Gary Minda is optimistic that for Law and Literature, the best is
yet to come: “This is where we are today; Law and Literature at cen-
tury’s end is just coming to acknowledge the full meaning and signifi-
cance of what it means to translate the meaning of a text.”42
Despite these disagreements over the nature, purpose, and efficacy
of Law and Literature, there is broad agreement that Law and Litera-
ture is useful for jurisprudence.  While jurisprudence has undergone
its own historical transformation, modern jurisprudence is “the study
of the general and fundamental elements of a particular legal system,
as opposed to its practical and concrete details.”43  Thus, even Posner
himself concedes, “[O]ne can learn a great deal of jurisprudence from
36. For a critique of CLS see ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A
LIBERAL CRITIQUE (Marshall Cohen ed., 1993). For a critique of postmodernism gen-
erally see DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS, TRUTH DECAY: DEFENDING CHRISTIANITY
AGAINST THE CHALLENGES OF POSTMODERNISM, 17–59 (2000).
37. JERRY J. PHILLIPS & JUDY M. CORNETT, SOUND AND SENSE: A TEXT ON LAW
AND LITERATURE v (2003).
38. Id.
39. Rockwood ed., supra note 3, at 19.
40. Hilde Hein, Law and Order in Art and Law, in 9 LAW AND LITERATURE PER-
SPECTIVES, 113 (Bruce L. Rockwood ed. 1996).
41. Id. at 114.
42. Minda supra note 9, at 256 (emphasis added).
43. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (10th ed. 2014).
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the works of literature . . . .”44  John Fisher also supports the legiti-
macy of Law and Literature with respect to jurisprudence when he
states, “The Law and Literature movement is . . . fundamentally a
form of jurisprudence.”45  Richard Weisberg further acknowledges,
“Law and Literature actually began as a subcategory of jurispru-
dence.”46  Therefore, as there is broad agreement regarding the effi-
cacy of Law and Literature with respect to jurisprudence, this Article
will use Tolkien’s works to specifically explore aspects of property law
jurisprudence.
D. The Literary Canon, Tolkien, and the Public Consciousness
As previously alluded to, there is significant debate within Law and
Literature regarding which literary texts should be used for Law and
Literature.47  Different legal scholars use a variety of criteria in deter-
mining the utility of studying a particular work of literature.  How-
ever, several works are granted near universal legitimacy such as
Charles Dickens’ Bleak House,48 Franz Kafka’s The Trial,49 and Fy-
odor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment.50  Indeed, this is not sur-
prising as each of these works and their authors are traditionally
within the Great Books literary canon and the pantheon of great au-
thors.  However, as discussed above, some proponents of Law and
Literature explicitly reject the “Great Books” within the Western tra-
dition—Shakespeare, Dickens, Melville, etc.—specifically because
they view Law and Literature as part of the larger deconstructivist
project, characterized by postmodernism and the Critical Studies ap-
proach.51  Richard Weisberg views this approach as misguided: “I do
not think the case has been made for Law and Literature’s aban-
doning the canon . . . .”52  In support of the Great Books approach,
perhaps in light of the logical deficiencies of postmodernism, Weisberg
notes, “There is a reason why, these days, lawyers are furthering the
return to the Great Books.”53
While the question of Tolkien’s place in the Great Books discussion
is an interesting one, the debate is superfluous to this Article.  The
44. POSNER, supra note 2, at 21–22.
45. John Fischer, Note, Reading Literature/Reaching Law: Is There a Literary Ju-
risprudence? 72 TEX. L. REV. 135, 137 (1993).
46. WEISBERG, supra note 15, at 3.
47. Id. at 122.
48. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853); see also PHILLIPS & CORNETT,
supra note 37, at 384–390.
49. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925); see also PHILLIPS & CORNETT, supra note
37, at 344–350; see also POSNER, supra note 2 at, 21.
50. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866); see also PHILLIPS &
CORNETT, supra note 37, at 379–384; see also POSNER, supra note 2, at 21.
51. See Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnick, Convergences: Law, Literature, and
Feminism 99 YALE L. J. 1913, 1937 (1990).
52. WEISBERG, supra note 15, at 122.
53. Id.
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utility of a particular work of fiction in using Law and Literature to
learn jurisprudence is unrelated to whether or not Tolkien is in the
literary canon (although it seems clear that Tolkien’s literature has
made the cut).54  Of far greater importance is the widespread societal
pervasiveness and enjoyment of the literary work.  That is, it matters
more for the purposes of this Article that many people read and enjoy
Tolkien, rather than whether Tolkien’s work is canonical or useful for
a postmodern agenda.
John Ronald Reuel Tolkien was a twentieth century English writer
and philologist, who is best known for his fantasy epics, The Hobbit
and The Lord of the Rings.55  Tolkien chaired the Department of En-
glish Language and Literature at Oxford University, and his profes-
sional activities included a position as Assistant Lexicographer for the
New Oxford English Dictionary.56  Despite his publisher’s low expec-
tations for The Lord of the Rings,57 Tolkien’s literature has been gen-
erally lauded since The Hobbit was first published in 1937.  Indeed,
several polls in 1999 rated The Lord of the Rings Trilogy as the great-
est book of the twentieth century.58  Moreover, Tolkien has been de-
scribed as “the most influential author of the [twentieth] century.”59
Time Magazine named The Lord of the Rings Trilogy third on its list
of the best novels from 1923–2005.60  The box office success61 and crit-
ical acclaim62 of the film adaptation of The Lord of the Rings Trilogy
and the current film adaptation of The Hobbit into respective three-
part films, have further cemented Tolkien’s stories into the public
consciousness.63
54. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, ALL-TIME 100 Novels, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 6,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/2005/100books/the_complete_list.html.
55. JRR Tolkien Biography, TOLKIENSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.tolkiensociety.org/
author/biography/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., COLIN DURIEZ, THE J.R.R. TOLKIEN HANDBOOK 11 (1992) (“[H]is
publishers were convinced that The Lord of the Rings might well make a financial loss
for them.”).
58. Andrew O’Hehir, The Book of the Century, SALON (June 4, 2001), http://www.
salon.com/2001/06/04/tolkien_3/.
59. TOM SHIPPEY, J.R.R. TOLKIEN: AUTHOR OF THE CENTURY (2002).
60. Lacayo, supra note 54.
61. Brett Pulley, ‘Hobbit’ Heirs Seek $220 Million for ‘Rings’ Rights (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aiAEIATGLREU (“The three films based on Tolkien’s fantasy epic—2001’s
‘The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring’; ‘The Lord of the Rings: The Two
Towers’ in 2002; and ‘The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King,’ released in
2003—have generated almost $3 billion in worldwide box-office receipts, and another
$3 billion from DVDs, merchandise and other sources . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Sharon Waxman, ‘Lord of the Rings’ Dominates the Oscars; Final
Film of Trilogy Sweeps 11 Categories; Sean Penn and Charlize Theron Get Top Acting
Awards, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/01/arts/lord-
rings-dominates-oscars-final-film-trilogy-sweeps-11-categories-sean-penn.html.
63. Indeed, the films and their licensed progeny have been so successful that
Tolkien’s estate has filed two separate lawsuits to seek compensation; see, e.g., Clau-
dia Eller & Rachel Abramowitz, Warner Bros. Settles Lawsuit Over ‘Lord of the
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While it is difficult to quantify the overall societal pervasiveness and
impact of a literary work, there do seem to be objective indicators that
one could use: film royalties, book royalties, merchandise royalties,
and critical acclaim all seem to indicate broad societal appeal.64  Addi-
tionally, one could further study (and someone possibly has) the rate
at which Tolkien’s books are checked out at libraries, the number of
college courses that significantly address Tolkien, and other creative
ways an author’s influence on society can be quantified.  Given the
sustained critical acclaim and popularity of Tolkien’s literature, this
Article will proceed on the assumption that The Hobbit and The Lord
of the Rings Trilogy are legitimate for Law and Literature purposes.
E. A Modest Proposal
As explained above, Law and Literature is a growing body of schol-
arship that has mixed reviews with respect to its utility.  Indeed, even
Law and Literature apologists find it difficult to agree on the exact
direction this discipline needs to take, and such ambiguity continues to
serve as fodder for its critics.65  However, there is broad agreement
that Law and Literature is useful for purposes of jurisprudence.  Thus,
the purpose of this Article is as a means for anyone—legal scholars
and professors, law students, and lay people—to begin to learn and
understand issues in property law jurisprudence through J.R.R.
Tolkien’s well-known and beloved stories.
The final reason that this Article attempts to frame Tolkien’s litera-
ture through the lens of property law is to provoke within an individ-
ual an interest in property law jurisprudence where such interest did
not previously exist.  The corollary to provoked interest is additional
exploration, study, and eventually competence or even expertise in
property law.  That is, the purpose of this Article is quite modest: in-
troduce, provoke interest, and begin to learn all connote this Author’s
posture regarding what this Article can actually accomplish. Finally,
lest any veteran, curmudgeon, legal scholars, and practitioners forget,
this Author hastens to remind them that many successful legal profes-
sionals’ first interest in law was piqued by the likes of Atticus Finch,
Perry Mason, and Jack McCoy.  In the same way these fictional char-
acters did, Tolkien’s literature, if properly framed, may have the abil-
ity to inspire an interest in the law.  If law is indeed a noble profession,
I say the more the merrier.  Here is hoping this Article leads to more.
Rings’ Licensing Payments, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/sep/09/business/fi-ct-hobbit9; see also Pulley, supra note 61.
64. Waxman, supra note 62; see Pulley, supra note 61.
65. POSNER, supra note 2, at 7.
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III. PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE IN TOLKIEN’S LITERATURE
A. Introduction
While it is not within the realm of a traditional literary analysis, it
would not be inappropriate to suggest that property, including its na-
ture and uses, is a dominant theme throughout Tolkien’s The Hobbit
and The Lord of the Rings Trilogy.66  This analysis would certainly be
acceptable in the context of Law and Literature scholarship.  Though
it is doubtless there are more, this Article addresses several theoreti-
cal considerations related to property law jurisprudence—that is, the
“bundle of sticks”—that Tolkien covers, as well as briefly surveys sev-
eral legal property issues that play a significant role throughout
Tolkien’s literature.  The property issues are: (1) acquisition by crea-
tion or occupancy; (2) acquisition by finding, including lost, mislaid,
and abandoned property; (3) forfeiture of property obtained through
criminal activity; and (4) inter vivos gifts.
This next section begins by examining how Tolkien addresses the
theoretical foundations of property ownership, or, the “bundle of
sticks.”  Then, four property issues will be considered by identifying a
legal issue as presented by Tolkien’s literature and the relevant com-
mon law property rule, analyzing the content from Tolkien and the
common law rule, and predicting the likely legal outcome of the
Tolkien scenario.
B. Tolkien and the Bundle of Sticks
In one edition of The Lord of the Rings, the publisher, Ballantine
Books, summarized Tolkien’s story this way:
J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings—of which this book is the
first part—is a chronicle of the great War of the Ring . . . At that
time, the One Ring . . . had been held for many years by the hobbits,
but was eagerly sought by the Enemy who made it . . . Out of the
struggle to possess and control the One Ring . . . there arose a war
. . . The Fellowship of the Ring begins the story of . . . the flight of
Frodo—unwilling heir to the One Ring—from his own land [. . .]
[and] of the great Council at which it was decided that the Ring
must be destroyed . . . [Frodo and his companions must] return the
Ring to Mordor . . . and . . . destroy it . . . .67
This excerpt nicely identifies several key theoretical property law is-
sues that permeate Tolkien’s epic stories.
66. See, e.g., DURIEZ, supra note 57, at 206–08; see also Christina Sterbenz, 6 Laws
from ‘Lord of the Rings’, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 17, 2013), http://www.businessin-
sider.com/law-in-the-lord-of-the-rings-2013-6; Ilya Somin, Property Law in the Lord
of the Rings, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 30, 2008, 2:45 AM), http://www.volokh.com/
posts/1206859543.shtml.
67.  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING (Ballantine Books 1965)
(1954) (emphasis added).
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If asked to describe property law, many property law professors, as
well as most law students, will begin by talking about a bundle of
rights, or what is also known as “the bundle of sticks.”68  The bundle
of sticks is a metaphor that property professors commonly use to in-
troduce law students to the theoretical considerations that run
throughout the corpus of property law.69  The metaphor works by
comparing various property interests in real or personal property to a
bundle of sticks.  In that sense, it is possible for multiple parties to
each have a legal interest in a piece of property just as it is possible for
multiple parties to each have one stick out of the whole bundle.70  The
fact that several people can have multiple sticks in the same piece of
property is what gives rise to many legal actions regarding real and
personal property.  The bundle of sticks typically consists of the fol-
lowing interests: ownership, possession, the right to transfer, usage or
control, division, exclusion, and destruction.71  While there is some de-
bate regarding the legitimacy of the bundle of sticks metaphor, Profes-
sor Richard Epstein suggests, “[T]he bundle of rights normally
associated with the concept of property, far from being randomly and
fortuitously put together, actually coheres and forms the basis of huge
portions of the terrain of the ordinary common law.”72  Assuming that
the bundle of sticks is actually a helpful metaphor, this Article will
discuss three of these rights in relation to Tolkien’s literature: (1) own-
ership; (2) possession; and (3) destruction of property.
1. Ownership
The concept of property ownership is of such importance that it is
often expressed not simply as one of the sticks, but as the entire bun-
dle.73  Frank Hall Childs defines property ownership as the “dominion
over things, the right to deal with them in some particular manner to
the exclusion of others, to use, to enjoy, and to dispose of them.”74  As
part of the bundle of property rights, an individual may both own real
or personal property, and yet not possess or control said property:
“Ownership is distinct from possession.”75  Indeed, when contractual
68. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 83 (Vicki Bean et al. eds., 7th ed.
2010); see also Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV.
247, 247 (2007) (“Whatever its faults or inadequacies, the bundle of rights is the domi-
nant legal paradigm for the courts and the theory of property that is taught to Ameri-
can law students.”); but see generally Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2003).
69. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002).
70. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 254.
71. Id. at 253.
72. Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 3
(1990).
73. Johnson, supra note 68, at 247.
74. FRANK HALL CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 121
(1914).
75. Id.
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and policy considerations are involved, the owner of the property may
not even be able to transfer, exclude, or even destroy his own prop-
erty.76  Simply put, “The right to acquire, use, and transfer property is
not unlimited.”77  Still, in property law jurisprudence, ownership mat-
ters.  For example, in legal actions involving found property, it is only
the true owner of the personal property that has superior claim
against the finder.78  Thus, the concept of property ownership is of
first importance with respect to the bundle of sticks.
Just as ownership is primary regarding the bundle of sticks, it is pri-
mary in Tolkien’s literature.  In The Fellowship of the Ring, the wizard
Gandalf recounted a detailed history of the One Ring (“Ring”) to
Frodo Baggins, now in possession of the Ring.79  Frodo became re-
pulsed upon learning about the wretched creature Gollum, and he la-
mented that his uncle, Bilbo Baggins, did not simply kill Gollum when
he had the chance.80  Gandalf responded that pity and mercy were the
virtues that prevented Bilbo from killing Gollum, and he concluded
with this comment: “Be sure that [Bilbo] took so little hurt from the
evil, and escaped in the end, because he began his ownership of the
Ring so.  With Pity.”81  According to Tolkien, the issue of ownership
of the Ring was connected with Bilbo’s possession of the Ring.82  Ad-
ditionally, when Gandalf tells Bilbo, “I was professionally interested
in your ring,” he is acknowledging that Bilbo is the current owner of
the Ring.83  Gandalf made a similar statement to Frodo after Bilbo
gave the Ring to Frodo: “Your ring is shown to be that One Ring by
the fire-writing alone . . . .”84  These references are frequent in
Tolkien, and they all relate to the property right of ownership with
respect to the Ring.
2. Possession
Possession is another important concept in the bundle of property
rights.  Particularly with respect to lessor-lessee agreements, someone
other than the true owner can possess property.  Possession can be
defined as, “The right to exclusive physical control of the thing
owned.”85  Epstein argues that the possession stick has a powerful, yet
“negative impulse” because the right to possess if left alone would
only lead “up to a grand blockade [where] I could stop everybody else
76. See infra, Part III.B.3.
77. CHILDS, supra note 74.
78. See RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 26 (3d ed. 1975),
quoted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 98.
79. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 78–95.
80. Id. at 92.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
84. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 88 (emphasis added).
85. Johnson, supra note 68, at 253.
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from doing anything with the property that I owned, but there would
be nothing else that I could do with the property myself.”86  The con-
cept of possession is also important when two or more individuals
claim title to the same thing.87  Therefore, while ownership is a theo-
retical concept of first importance in property law, possession is a
close second, especially with respect to property value.
Throughout The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings Trilogy, the is-
sue of possession, with respect to the Ring, is ubiquitous.  Tolkien
scholar Colin Duriez supports this understanding when he states that
“Tolkien explores power in relation to possession” and “[p]ower is a
unifying theme . . . .”88  For example, Gandalf indicated that Bilbo’s
ownership of the Ring began when he first possessed the Ring.89  In
the Prologue to The Fellowship of the Ring, Tolkien recounts the his-
tory of the Ring, and he mentions that Gollum “possessed a secret
treasure that had come to him long ages ago, when he still lived in the
light: a ring of gold that made its wearer invisible.”90  In a heated ex-
change between Gandalf and Bilbo, Gandalf admonishes Bilbo to let
go of the Ring for the last time: “Go away and leave [the Ring] be-
hind. Stop possessing it.”91  Finally, there is even a more philosophical
exchange regarding possession of the Ring between Gandalf and
Frodo, after Gandalf had explained the true nature and origin of the
Ring.  Gandalf warned Frodo that “it would utterly overcome anyone
of mortal race who possessed it. It would possess him.”92  While
Gandalf’s philosophical warning lacks legal resonance, it does under-
score the ubiquity and importance of possessing the Ring in Tolkien’s
literature.
3. Destruction of Property
A century ago Frank Hall Childs stated, “Personal property may
cease to exist, or at least to have any value, by its destruction, which
may result from accident, or from intention through human agency.”93
However, today there is some debate regarding the right of owners to
destroy their own property.94  The venerable Black’s Law Dictionary
became part of this debate when it changed its definition of owner
from the sixth to seventh edition.95  Specifically, the sixth edition con-
tained the definition of owner as:
86. Epstein, supra note 72.
87. CHILDS, supra note 74, at 164.
88. DURIEZ, supra note 57, at 206 (emphasis added).
89. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 92.
90. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
93. CHILDS, supra note 74, at 430 (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781
(2005).
95. Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 783.
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The person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of
property; proprietor. He who has dominion of a thing, real or per-
sonal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and do
with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law per-
mits, unless he be prevented by some agreement or covenant which
restrains his right.96
The seventh edition, instead, chose to define owner as, “One who has
the right to possess, use, and convey something; a proprietor.”97  In-
terestingly, the seventh edition omitted language indicating that the
owner has the right to destroy his own property.98  The recently re-
leased tenth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also omits language
indicating a property owner’s right to destroy.99  Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz asserts that as a policy matter, courts are increasingly
likely to remove this stick from the property owner’s bundle: “When
asked to resolve cases where one party seeks to destroy her property,
courts have reacted with great hostility toward the owner’s destructive
plans.”100  This further illustrates how it is helpful to think of property
interests as a bundle of sticks or rights, and that even owners in pos-
session of their property are not simply free to do whatever they want
with their property.
The culmination of The Lord of the Rings Trilogy takes place in The
Return of the King.101  Frodo and his traveling companion Sam
Gamgee, the remnants of the original fellowship, have finally made it
to Mordor, with the intention of destroying the Ring by casting it into
the “Cracks of Doom in the depths of Orodruin, the Fire mountain
. . . .”102  As the story builds to its climax, Frodo is at the Cracks of
Doom, when Gollum surprises him.103  Gollum’s all-consuming desire
for the Ring would not be denied, and in a final effort to regain con-
trol of the Ring, he bit off Frodo’s finger with the Ring still on it
before falling into the Cracks of Mount Doom destroying the Ring
once and for all.104
Indeed, the destruction of the Ring is not simply the culmination of
the story, but the very impetus.  Speaking to Frodo in The Fellowship
of the Ring, Gandalf states that there is only one way to break the
power of the Ring and prevent it from falling into the hands of
Sauron: “[F]ind the Cracks of Doom, in the depths of Orodruin, the
96. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1991), quoted in Strahilevitz, supra
note 91 (emphasis added).
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (7th ed. 1999), quoted in Strahilevitz, supra
note 91.
98. Id. at 1130–31.
99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (10th ed. 2014).
100. Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 784.
101. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE RETURN OF THE KING (HarperCollins 5th ed. 2011)
(1955).
102. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 94.
103. TOLKIEN, supra note 101, at 943.
104. Id. at 946.
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Fire-mountain, and cast the Ring in there, if you really wish to destroy
it . . . .”105  Frodo’s reply left no doubt as to his intentions: “‘I really do
wish to destroy it!’ cried Frodo. ‘Or, well, to have it destroyed.’”106
Indeed, it was Frodo’s desire to destroy the Ring that began the great
quest on which the entire Lord of the Rings Trilogy is premised.
While the bundle of property rights may not always include the right
to destroy, the destruction of the Ring was central to Tolkien’s story,
and destroying the Ring was a legitimate goal in its literary context.
C. Acquisition by Creation
Both The Hobbit and, more so, The Lord of the Rings Trilogy are
centered on the One Ring (“Ring”), but these stories focus exclusively
on the claims to the Ring in its present state of existence.107  Tolkien,
however, does provide an account of the origin of the Ring.  In The
Fellowship of the Ring, Frodo, upon learning about the power of the
Ring, expressed his trepidation to Gandalf: “‘This ring!’ He stam-
mered. ‘How, how on earth did it come to me?’”108  This prompted
Gandalf to provide a brief history of the Ring, beginning with “Sauron
the Great, the Dark Lord.”109  In explaining Sauron’s plan to consoli-
date power by obtaining the Ring, Gandalf stated, “He only needs the
One; for he made that ring himself, it is his, and let a great part of his
own power pass into it . . . .”110  Later in the conversation, Frodo was
increasingly distressed by the Ring’s power and checkered history,
and he expressed a desire to simply destroy the Ring.111  This
prompted a degree of amusement from Gandalf followed by an expla-
nation and demonstration of how it was nearly impossible to destroy
the Ring.112  Gandalf concluded by stating, “[N]or was there ever any
dragon, not even Ancalagon the Black, who could have harmed the
One Ring, the Ruling Ring, for that was made by Sauron himself.”113
Appendix B in The Return of the King also identifies c. 1600 of the
Second Age as the date when “Sauron forge[d] the One Ring in
Orodruin.”114  Tolkien clearly identifies Sauron as the creator of the
Ring in these passages.  Moreover, Gandalf’s admission that “it is his”
indicates Sauron is indeed the Ring’s rightful owner.
A legal issue here is whether any subsequent possessors of the Ring
could prevail in an action against Sauron.  The notion that one can
acquire property through creation or occupancy is “the first general
105. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 94.
106. Id.
107. See infra, Part III.D–F.
108. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 81.
109. Id. at 81.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See infra, Part III.B.3.
112. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 93–94.
113. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
114. TOLKIEN, supra note 101, at 1083.
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mode of acquiring title to personal property.”115  As Horace E. Smith
states, acquisition by occupancy “is primal,” and “[o]ccupancy is gen-
erally regarded as the first known method of acquiring exclusive title
to property.116  D.F. Libling argues that this principle is deeply em-
bedded in the common law:
Any expenditure of mental or physical effort, as a result of which
there is created an entity, whether tangible or intangible, vests in
the person who brought the entity into being, a proprietary right to
the commercial exploitation of that entity, which right is separate
and independent from the ownership of that entity.117
From this understanding, some legal scholars extrapolated that
Libling’s theory of a creator’s right trades on John Locke’s under-
standing that “you own the fruits of your labor in consequence of hav-
ing ‘a property in your own person.’”118  While this Article focuses on
the common law rules that govern property, Locke’s Labor Theory of
Property is often considered a principle of natural law.119 Pace some
contemporary legal scholars, it was classically understood that com-
mon law is derived from natural law.120  Harkening back to a “State of
Nature,” Locke reasoned that one ought to possess the fruits of one’s
own labor because it is an individual’s work created the thing pos-
sessed, thus connecting labor and ownership.121  Although Locke’s
Labor Theory is often discussed today in the context of intellectual
property, his understanding of property acquired through creation un-
dergirds the entire corpus of personal property at common law.  While
“the fruits of your labor are not always yours alone to exploit, and you
do not always have full rights of property in your own person,” it is a
settled rule of common law that one generally owns the fruits of one’s
labor.122
Here, the facts from Tolkien clearly indicate that Sauron the Great,
or the Dark Lord, is the creator of the Ring.  Gandalf readily admits
115. HORACE E. SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 52
(1893).
116. Id.
117. D.F. Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles, 94 L.Q. REV.
103, 104 (1978), quoted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 56.
118. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68.
119. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CON-
CERNING TOLERATION, Of Property, Chapter V (J.W. Gough, 1948).
120. WILLIAM C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: ABRIDGED Sec. II, 3
(Callaghan & Co., 9th ed. 1915).
121. Supra note 119, at 15 (“Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be com-
mon to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has
any Right to but him. The Labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes from out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it some-
thing that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed
from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed
to it, that excludes the common right of other Men.”).
122. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 56.
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so multiple times.123  While neither The Hobbit nor The Lord of the
Rings Trilogy takes place during the period in which Sauron created
and possessed the Ring,124 there is no dispute that Sauron created the
Ring, and as such, is the Ring’s true owner.  Applying common law
principles, Sauron would prevail in an action against any of the subse-
quent possessors of the Ring, unless some intervening event had taken
place such as abandonment or assignment of the Ring.125  In any ac-
tion between any of the subsequent possessors (Isildur, De´agol, Gol-
lum, Bilbo, or Frodo), none could claim a right to possession under a
theory of occupancy.  Instead, the dispute would involve subsequent
possessors of property.126
D. Acquisition by Finding
After Bilbo Baggins gifted Frodo the Ring, Gandalf explained to
Frodo the significance of the Ring.127  This explanation caused Frodo
to become distressed regarding the great power behind the Ring, and
the evil of those who sought to possess the Ring.  Frodo could finally
take no more as he exclaimed, “I wish [Bilbo] had not kept the Ring.
I wish he had never found it . . . .”128  Here, Frodo is referring to The
Hobbit when Bilbo first came upon the Ring after he fell into orc
mines in the depths of the Misty Mountains.129  Gandalf also claimed,
“Behind that, there was something else at work, behind any design of
the Ring-Maker.  I can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was
meant to find the Ring, and not by its maker.”130  Here, Gandalf ac-
knowledged the existence of a “Ring-Maker,” Sauron, and yet he
claimed that Bilbo was meant to find and possess the Ring.131
To further solidify that the Ring was indeed found, in the Prologue
to The Fellowship of the Ring, Tolkien actually titled the section
describing how Bilbo came upon the Ring as, “Of the Finding of the
Ring.”132  Here, a legal issue to explore is whether Gollum would pre-
vail in an action against Bilbo.  To do so, it must be determined where
and how Frodo found the Ring, and whether the Ring was lost, mis-
laid, or abandoned by Gollum when Bilbo found it.
123. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 81, 94.
124. See TOLKIEN supra note 101, at 1083 (The One Ring was created in the Second
Age whereas The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings Trilogy take place in the Third
Age).
125. See infra Part III.D.
126. Id.
127. See supra Part III.C.
128. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 93 (emphasis added).
129. See J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBIT, 76 (Ballantine Books revised ed. 1982)
(1937).
130. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 88.
131. For a look at Tolkien’s use of providence, see DURIEZ supra note 57, at 208–12.
132. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 32 (emphasis added).
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One of the classic cases regarding lost personal property is Armory
v. Delamirie.133  In Armory, a son of a chimney sweeper found a rare
jewel while cleaning the home of a customer.134  After the boy took
the jewel to a local goldsmith to be appraised, the goldsmith’s appren-
tice attempted to keep the jewel after learning about how valuable it
was.135  In its holding, the Armory court articulated a common law
rule that the title of the finder is good as against the whole world but
the true owner.136  However, if the dispute is between the landowner
and the finder, “the landowner will win if the finder was trespassing at
the time she found the object.”137  Thus, title of the finder is good
against the whole world but the true owner, provided the finder was
not trespassing when she found the object.
Another significant case that addressed personal property found on
the real property of another is Hannah v. Peel.138  In Hannah, a sol-
dier in World War II found a brooch while staying at another’s home
during the war.139  The homeowner was not living there at the time.140
The Hannah court, which entered a judgment for the soldier, articu-
lated the following rules: “A man possesses everything which is at-
tached to or under his land.  Secondly . . . a man does not necessarily
possess a thing which is lying unattached on the surface of his land
even though the thing is not possessed by someone else.”141
Here, Bilbo found his Ring during an accidental fall into the depths
of the Misty Mountains.  As it happened, Bilbo ended up encounter-
ing Gollum near his home.  In a conversation with Gandalf, Bilbo
states, “[The Ring] is my own.  I found it.  It came to me . . . It is mine,
I tell you.  My own.”142  Tolkien’s account provided that Bilbo found
the Ring in an area outside of Gollum’s property.143  Since Bilbo did
not find the Ring while on Gollum’s property, the rule from Hannah
does not apply.  Therefore, the Armory rule controls, and Bilbo would
have a right to the Ring against everyone but the Ring’s true owner.
The legal issue now becomes whether the Ring was lost, mislaid, or
133. Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505 (King’s Bench 1722), quoted in
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 98.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. RAY A. BROWN & WALTER B. RAUSHENBUSH, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY 26 (Callaghan & Co., 3d ed. 1975), quoted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68,
at 98.
137. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, & PRACTICES 96
(5th ed. 2010).
138. Hannah v. Peel, 1 K.B. 509 (U.K.), quoted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
68, at 101–02.
139. Id. at 102.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 106.
142. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 59.
143. TOLKIEN, supra note 129, at 76, 79 (“Actually Gollum lived on a slimy island
of rock in the middle of the lake.”).
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abandoned by Gollum when Bilbo found it, and whether Gollum was
indeed the Ring’s true owner.
1. Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned Property
Of all of the property law issues, lost, mislaid, and abandoned per-
sonal property may be the most significant throughout the narrative.
For example, in The Hobbit, the Ring was discovered by Bilbo in the
Misty Mountains,144 and there would be a genuine factual dispute as
to whether Gollum lost or mislaid the Ring.145  After Bilbo and the
thirteen dwarves reached the Misty Mountains, Bilbo was separated
from the group, and he ended up tumbling into the black orc mines,
deep in the Misty Mountains.146  As Bilbo lay there after his fall “he
groped in vain in the dark, he put his hand on the ring, lying on the
floor of a tunnel.  He put it in his pocket.”147  Tolkien tells us that,
“Trying to find his way out, Bilbo went on down to the roots of the
mountains, until he could go no further.  At the bottom of the tunnel
lay a cold lake far from the light, and on an island of rock in the water
lived Gollum.”148  Tolkien, who interestingly never goes as far as to
grant title to Gollum, instead states, “[Gollum] possessed a secret trea-
sure that had come to him long ages ago . . . a ring of gold that made
its wearer invisible.”149  After Gollum’s encounter with Bilbo ended
poorly for Gollum, “He slipped away, and returned to his island . . .
far off in the dark water.  There, he thought, lay his ring.”150  Tolkien
concludes, “But the ring was not on the island; he had lost it . . . .”151
As the theme of Providence runs throughout Tolkien’s work, it is also
interesting that Gandalf tells Frodo, “[The Ring] abandoned
Gollum.”152
At common law, courts divide personal property into lost, mislaid,
and abandoned property:
Property is lost when the owner accidentally misplaced it; it is mis-
laid when the owner intentionally left it somewhere—and then for-
gets where she put it; it is abandoned when the owner forms an
intent to relinquish all rights in the property.  Property that has
been lost or mislaid may subsequently be abandoned if the owner
intends to give up any claim to the property.153
Horace E. Smith asserts that “[a]t common law, to goods lost by the
owner and unreclaimed, or designedly abandoned by him, the finder
144. Id. at 76.
145. See id. at 80–87.
146. Id. at 65–68.
147. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 32.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 33.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 88.
153. SINGER, supra note 137, at 95.
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acquires title by occupancy.”154  However, the former owner must
have “completely relinquished the chattel before a perfect title will
accrue to the finder.”155 Michael v. First Chicago Corp. articulated the
common law rule that “[a] finder of property acquires no rights in
mislaid property, is entitled to possession of lost property against eve-
ryone except the true owner, and is entitled to keep abandoned prop-
erty.”156  While this general rule is correct as far as it goes, it does not
go far enough, so different jurisdictions consider additional factors,
such as if the property was found in a public or private place.157
Courts distinguish between when an object is considered lost or
abandoned and un-reclaimed, and when it is considered mislaid. Lost
property:
[M]ay be defined as that which the owner has involuntarily parted
with through neglect, carelessness, or inadvertence.  There is a pre-
sumption of abandonment obtaining until the owner appears and
claims the property, that gives the right as legal possessor to the
finder, the presumption being disputable by the rightful owner.158
Property is considered mislaid when “the owner intentionally places
where he can again resort to it, and then forgets.”159  When mislaid
property is found on the land of another, it “is presumed to be left in
the custody of the owner or occupier of the premises upon which it is
found, and it is generally held that the right of possession to mislaid
property as against all except the true owner is in the owner or occu-
pant of such premises.”160  In order for a property to be considered
abandoned, courts have determined two elements must be present:
“[T]he law demands proof both of an owner’s intent to abandon the
property and of some affirmative act or omission demonstrating that
intention.”161  The owner’s intent to abandon and the subsequent af-
firmative act or omission require fact-dependent analyses.
Here, Tolkien is clear that Gollum “had lost [the Ring].”162  Tolkien
states that Gollum “kept [the Ring] hidden safe in a hole on his island,
except when he was hunting or spying on the orcs of the mines.”163
Bilbo found the Ring in the orc mines, above Gollum’s island where
he kept the Ring hidden.164  Additionally, it is part of the record that
154. SMITH, supra note 115, at 58.
155. Id.
156. Michael v. First Chicago Corp., 487 N.E.2d 403, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
157. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 68, at 109.
158. J.E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Rights in Respect of Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned
Property as Between the Finder and Person Upon Whose Property it is Found, 170
A.L.R. 706 § 2 (1947).
159. Id. at  3.
160. Id.
161. Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, Conn., 933 F.2d 1131, 1138 (2d Cir. 1991).
162. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 33.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 32.
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Gollum would go out spying on the orcs, and this was the only time he
would take the Ring off his island home.165  Therefore, it is not likely
that the Ring was intentionally placed in the tunnel where Bilbo found
it, and there is no evidence that Gollum had simply forgotten where
he last set down the Ring.  Instead, it is likely that the Ring was simply
dropped by Gollum during one of his orc-watching excursions.  In-
deed, Frodo specifically asked Gandalf, “[W]hy didn’t [Gollum] get
rid of [the Ring], or go away and leave it?”166  Gandalf responded, “A
Ring of Power looks after itself.  It may slip off treacherously, but its
keeper never abandons it.”167  Gollum certainly thought he lost the
Ring, or as he called it, “Precious”: “‘Where is it? Where iss it?’ Bilbo
heard [Gollum] crying.  ‘Losst it is, my precious, lost, lost!  Curse us
and crush us, my precious is lost!’”168  Thus, while it could be argued
that the Ring was mislaid, it is more likely that Gollum lost the Ring.
After falling into the Misty Mountains, Bilbo discovered the Ring in
a tunnel, above the “island of rock in the water” where Gollum
lived.169  That is to say, the Ring was not discovered on the property
of Gollum.  If Bilbo had discovered the Ring on the property of Gol-
lum, then it would need to be determined if he was a trespasser, and
Hannah would apply.  However, because the Ring would likely be
considered lost personal property, found by Bilbo, and not on the
property of Gollum, the rule from Armory controls; Bilbo would pre-
vail against everyone except the true owner of the Ring.  Therefore,
Gollum’s own means of obtaining possession of the Ring need to be
scrutinized to determine if he is in fact the Ring’s true owner.  If Gol-
lum is the true owner, he would prevail in an action against Bilbo to
reclaim his lost Ring.  However, if Gollum is not the Ring’s true
owner, Bilbo would prevail.
E. Property Obtained through Criminal Activity
Tolkien’s literature has been lauded in large part due to the depth
of history and detail he created regarding Middle Earth.  This in-
cluded chronologies, genealogies, and even an Elvish language.170
Tolkien even included some details of the legal customs of hobbits:
“[Bilbo’s will] was, unfortunately, very clear and correct (according to
the legal customs of hobbits, which demanded among other things
seven signatures of witnesses in red ink).”171  While Tolkien did dis-
cuss some hobbit political mores with respect to municipalities and
165. Id. at 33.
166. Id. at 87.
167. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 87 (emphasis added).
168. TOLKIEN, supra note 129, at 82.
169. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 32.
170. See TOLKIEN, supra note 101, at Apps. A-F.
171. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 66.
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governmental structure,172 Tolkien never provided a fully developed
legal system.  However, this Article assumes that Middle Earth was a
common law jurisdiction, and that includes criminal activity.  There-
fore, the next legal issue is to determine whether Gollum obtained the
Ring through criminal activity, and how that would affect any legal
action brought by Gollum seeking the courts to help him regain the
lost Ring.
The story regarding how Gollum came upon the Ring was passed
down from Gandalf to Frodo in The Fellowship of the Ring.173  One
day Gollum was out on a river at Gladden Fields with his friend,
De´agol, when they parted company.174  Gollum went to look around
the riverbanks, while De´agol took the boat out to fish.175  De´agol
hooked a fish so large that he was pulled into the water.176  As De´agol
was dragged to the bottom of the river, he spotted and grabbed a
shiny object in the riverbed.177  The shiny object was the One Ring.
Sme´agol witnessed De´agol’s discovery, and he immediately suggested
to De´agol that the Ring would be a fine birthday present for
Sme´agol.178  When De´agol demurred, Sme´agol “caught De´agol by the
throat and strangled him, because the gold looked so bright and beau-
tiful.”179  Gandalf confirmed the criminal nature of Sme´agol’s action
by stating, “No one ever found out what had become of De´agol; he
was murdered far from home, and his body was cunningly hidden.”180
He later reiterated, “The murder of De´agol haunted Gollum.”181  Ac-
cording to Appendix B: “The Tale of Years” in The Return of the
King, the year of 2463 in the Third Age, is described as, “About [the]
time De´agol the Stoor finds the One Ring, and is murdered by
Sme´agol.”182  Tolkien’s record is clear that Gollum obtained the Ring
by committing the criminal act of murder.
Murder is the killing of another human being with malice afore-
thought.183  Malice aforethought is “a fixed purpose or design to do
some physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed,
and it may be shown by proof that the defendant, without justification
or excuse, intended to kill the victim, or to do the victim grievous
bodily harm.”184  Malice is considered present “when an unlawful
homicide has been committed with the intention unlawfully to take
172. Id. at 29–32.
173. Id. at 78–95.
174. Id. at 84.
175. Id.
176. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 84.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 85.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 89.
182. TOLKIEN, supra note 101, at 1087.
183. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 36 (2014).
184. Id.
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away the life of a fellow human being, or with awareness of the danger
and a conscious disregard for life.”185  The distinction between first
and second degree murder is that while second degree murder only
requires malice aforethought, first degree murder requires evidence of
premeditation.186
As previously discussed, the common law is derived from principles
of natural law.187  According to Riggs v. Palmer, it is considered a
maxim of natural law that, “No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own
crime.”188  In Riggs, a grandson, Palmer, killed his grandfather after
he discovered that his grandfather was going to disinherit him.189  Al-
though the plain language of New York’s controlling Statute of Wills
would still have allowed Palmer to take under his grandfather’s will,
the Riggs court held that, “[One] shall not acquire property by his
crime, and thus be rewarded for its commission.”190  While this case
has been criticized for its problematic method of statutory interpreta-
tion, the common law maxim supporting the decision remains valid.
Another relevant legal doctrine is that “before a complainant can
have a standing in court he must first show that not only has he a good
and meritorious cause of action, but he must come into court with
clean hands.”191  Also known as the Clean Hands Doctrine, this princi-
ple dictates that “the equitable powers of . . . court can never be ex-
erted in behalf of one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or
any unfair means has gained an advantage.”192  However, this doctrine
is limited in that it does not “close [the] doors because of plaintiff’s
misconduct, whatever its character, that has no relation to anything
involved in the suit.”193  Instead, one who seeks equity from courts
must have clean hands in “immediate and necessary relation to the
equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in litigation.”194  Thus, the
Clean Hands Doctrine is designed to prevent courts from becoming
“abetter[s] of iniquity,” with respect to the specific issue before the
court.195
The Clean Hands Doctrine would likely bar Gollum from bringing
an action seeking a court to grant relief by returning the Ring to him.
Gollum first obtained the Ring through the unlawful, indeed criminal,
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. SPRAGUE, supra note 120.
188. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511 (N.Y. 1889).
189. Id. at 508–09.
190. Id. at 514.
191. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244 (1933).




\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\2-1\TWR102.txt unknown Seq: 24 26-NOV-14 10:39
48 TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROPERTY LAW [Vol. 2
act of murder.  Therefore, Gollum could not then use the courts to
retrieve the Ring from Frodo.  Even if Gollum did make it to court, he
would not be found to have title to the Ring because it would offend
the common law principle that one should not obtain property from
his crime and thereby benefit from its commission.  Here, Gollum ob-
tained the Ring by strangling De´agol.  Gandalf’s account alleged that
Gollum “caught De´agol by the throat and strangled him, because the
gold looked so bright and beautiful.”196  This was likely done with
malice aforethought as Gollum clearly wanted to do De´agol harm and
take his ring.  However, there does not appear to be premeditation, so
Gollum’s offense would be second degree murder.  Under the rule in
Riggs, Gollum would have to forfeit the Ring.  Just as Palmer was pre-
vented from taking under his grandfather’s will in Riggs, Gollum
should be prevented from murdering De´agol, and then profiting by
gaining title to the Ring.  Indeed, if Gollum were allowed to keep the
Ring, he would be directly “acquiring property by his own crime.”197
Therefore, it is likely that Gollum is not the Ring’s true owner be-
cause he obtained the Ring through a criminal act.
F. Inter Vivos Gifts
The opening of The Fellowship of the Ring begins at the Shire with
birthday party preparations by and for the eccentric hobbit, Bilbo
Baggins.198  Following the party, Bilbo left the Shire for good, but not
before he conveyed his house and much of his property to his nephew
and heir, Frodo.199  Most importantly, Bilbo transferred the Ring to
Frodo.  Tolkien includes the fact that such a gift was executed within
the legal custom of hobbits: “[Bilbo’s will] was, unfortunately, very
clear and correct (according to the legal customs of hobbits, which
demand among other things seven signatures of witnesses in red
ink).”200  It is also noteworthy that while Frodo is indeed Bilbo’s
nephew, Bilbo had also adopted Frodo as his heir, again within the
legal custom of hobbits.201  The legal issues regarding Bilbo’s transfer
of the Ring to Frodo are to determine whether this was an inter vivos
or causa mortis gift, and whether it is a valid transfer so that Frodo
had legal ownership of the Ring following the transaction.
Childs defines a gift “in its broadest sense, [as] a transfer of prop-
erty, services, or rights without consideration.”202  The common law
separates lifetime gifts into causa mortis gifts and inter vivos gifts.203
196. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 85.
197. Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 511.
198. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 43–69.
199. Id. at 61.
200. Id. at 66.
201. Id. at 21 (“But in the days of Bilbo, and of Frodo his heir . . .” (emphasis
added).).
202. CHILDS, supra note 74, at 289.
203. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 173–74.
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Specifically, “A gift inter vivos is a voluntary, actual, and immediate
transfer of a thing by one living person to, or for, another living per-
son.”204  A causa mortis gift is one “made in contemplation of and in
expectation of immediate approaching death . . . .”205  Courts have
typically been more rigid in their application of causa mortis gifts than
inter vivos gifts due to policy reasons associated with wills formali-
ties,206 and because a causa mortis gift is essentially a will substitute.
However, the modern trend of relaxing wills act formalities has loos-
ened the application of causa mortis standards.207
Here, the record indicates that Bilbo’s gift followed hobbit legal
custom.208  While Bilbo was advanced in age (he had just celebrated
his “eleventy-first” birthday209), his conveyance of the Ring to Frodo
does not appear to be in contemplation of immediate approaching
death.  Indeed, Bilbo indicated to Gandalf that, upon leaving the
Shire, he planned to execute his plan of taking a holiday, which in-
cluded traveling to see mountains and writing his book.210  This is
hardly the plan of a one who believes his death is “immediate and
approaching.”  Therefore, this is likely to be considered an inter vivos
gift, and not a causa mortis gift.
Gruen v. Gruen was a classic case that articulated the common law
rules of inter vivos gifts.211  In Gruen, a son brought a claim against his
stepmother to recover a painting that she possessed.  The son alleged
his late father gave him title to the painting, but the father retained
possession until his death in 1980.212  The stepmother contended that
the gift was testamentary and invalid because it failed to comply with
will formalities.213  In its decision, the Gruen court articulated the fol-
lowing rules regarding inter vivos gifts: “First, to make a valid inter
vivos gift there must exist the intent on the part of the donor to make
a present transfer; delivery of the gift, either actual or constructive to
the donee; and acceptance by the donee.”214  That is, for a valid inter
vivos gift, there must be: (1) Donative intent; (2) Delivery; and (3)
Acceptance.  The legal question then becomes whether or not evi-
dence in the record supports that this gift met all three elements for a
valid inter vivos gift.
It is likely that Bilbo possessed the requisite donative intent to
make this a valid inter vivos gift.  With respect to donative intent,
204. SMITH, supra note 115, at 125.
205. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 173.
206. See SMITH supra note 115, at 134.
207. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 173.
208. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 66.
209. Id. at 43.
210. Id. at 49.
211. Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 871 (N.Y. 1986).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 872.
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courts have held that “the intention of the grantor . . . may be mani-
fested by mere acts and words or both combined.”215  Here, Gandalf
asked Bilbo, before leaving for a long holiday, whether he planned to
leave the Ring to Frodo.  Bilbo responded, “Well, er, yes, I suppose so
. . . .”216  As Bilbo was about to leave, he discovered that the Ring was
actually still in his pocket.  This prompted him to say himself, “Yes
after all, why not?  Why shouldn’t it stay there?”217  Despite Gandalf’s
best efforts to persuade him, Bilbo seemed to conclude that the Ring
would stay with him permanently: “I shall keep it, I say.”218  This
touched off a heated exchange between Bilbo and Gandalf with
neither backing down.  However, Bilbo finally relented, as Gandalf
admonished him to, “Stop possessing it.  Give it to Frodo, and I will
look after him.”219  Bilbo responded, “Very well . . . [The Ring] goes
to Frodo with all the rest.”220  Although Bilbo required some convinc-
ing from Gandalf, in the end he manifested both the requisite words
and actions to demonstrate donative intent.
It is also likely that Bilbo’s delivery of the Ring was sufficient to
satisfy the second element of the inter vivos gift analysis.  For inter
vivos gifts, “The delivery must be as perfect as the nature of the prop-
erty, and circumstances and surroundings of the parties will reasona-
bly permit, and hence it may take one of the three forms recited.”221
Here, Bilbo asked Gandalf to deliver the Ring to Frodo: “You had
better take [the Ring] and deliver it for me.  That would be the saf-
est.”222  But Gandalf refused, and instead advised Bilbo to “[p]ut it on
the mantelpiece.  It will be safe enough there, till Frodo comes.”223
When Frodo arrived at the house, Gandalf told him that Bilbo left a
packet for him: “Frodo took the envelope from the mantelpiece, and
glanced at it, but did not open it.”224  After Gandalf told Frodo about
the envelope’s contents, Frodo exclaimed, “The Ring! . . . Has he left
me that?”225  Bilbo’s delivery of the Ring—leaving it on the mantle,
and having Gandalf tell Frodo about it—represents a constructive de-
livery of the Ring.  Therefore, it is likely that Bilbo’s gift met the de-
livery element of a valid inter vivos gift.
Finally, it is likely that Frodo accepted Bilbo’s gift of the Ring.  Ac-
ceptance “may be actual or implied and may also be evidenced by
words and conduct, need not be contemporaneous with delivery, but
215. Estate of Davenport v. Comm’r., 184 F.3d 1175, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999).
216. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 59.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 60.
219. Id. at 61.
220. Id.
221. Speaker v. Keating, 36 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
222. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 61.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 63.
225. Id.
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may be manifested subsequently.”226  Here, Frodo stated, “The Ring!
Has [Bilbo] left me that?  I wonder why.  Still, it may be useful.”227
As previously discussed, Gandalf would soon cause Frodo to question
whether he wanted to keep the Ring.228  However, at this time, it
seems Frodo had accepted the Ring (albeit more casually than he
probably should have).  Therefore, Frodo’s action of acknowledging
and accepting the Ring from Bilbo would likely meet the third ele-
ment for a valid inter vivos gift, granting Frodo title to the Ring.
IV. CONCLUSION
J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings Trilogy are
not simply popular and captivating fantasy epics, they can also be a
helpful tool for exploring issues in property law jurisprudence.  To re-
prise Tolkien, there is indeed an “applicability of fantasy.”229  Moreo-
ver, legal scholars can remain agnostic as to the legitimacy of Law and
Literature, and still recognize Tolkien’s works may provoke within a
colleague, practicing attorney, law student, or lay person an increased
interest in law generally, and an issue within property law more specif-
ically.  Thus, the approach taken in this Article is best thought of as a
first step in property law rather than a final destination (the same goes
for Tolkien’s literature).  If law is, as is often suggested by its practi-
tioners, a noble profession, those within its ranks must have the confi-
dence to both recognize and celebrate its manifestations throughout
society—even when they are found in unlikely places, or perhaps even
on an unlikely journey.
226. Speaker, 36 F. Supp. at 564.
227. TOLKIEN, supra note 67, at 63.
228. Id. at 76–81.
229. DURIEZ, supra note 57, at 9.
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